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23 June 77

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Attachment to NFIB-
32.1/20
23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Stansfield Turner
Chairman

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

1. The United States and the Soviet Union have begun preliminary discussions concerning the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to terminate nuclear testing, as proposed by the President. The significantly expanded dimension of this treaty, over that of the Limited Test Ban Treaty currently in effect, will increase the scope and complexity of the responsibilities assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence and bring into focus the issue of appropriate roles and missions within the Community.

2. In order to ensure that the Intelligence Community can assume these increased responsibilities, I have established an interagency CTB Intelligence Working Group, to be chaired by a member of the Intelligence Community Staff. Interested members are invited to designate to my Acting Deputy for the Intelligence Community (Point of Contact:) a representative to this group. The first meeting of the Working Group will convene at the Community Headquarters Building on 23 June 1977.

3. I am directing that this Working Group prepare a report for the NFIB no later than 15 August 1977 on the following two tasks:

--Task 1: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to examine in depth the appropriate roles and missions of the DCI and the Community agencies and organizations in the monitoring and verification of the proposed CTB. This examination should address the capabilities of and the interrelationship among Community elements as well as the

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interface of these elements with other government agencies and organizations, and should present issues and options for subsequent NFIB consideration.

--Task 2: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to determine the requirements for intelligence in support of CTB verification, to identify the resulting intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting needs; to analyze current and planned intelligence capabilities in order to identify deficiencies; to address the relationship between CTB and nuclear proliferation intelligence activities; to recommend improvements in intelligence capabilities and procedures; and to propose options for the coordination or management of interagency CTB monitoring functions.

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STANSFIELD TURNER

(22 June 1977)

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